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The Charity Beauty Premium: Satisfying Donors’ Want versus Should Desires 
 
Despite widespread conviction that neediness is the most important criterion for charitable 
allocations, we observe a “charity beauty premium” in which donors often favor beautiful, but 
less needy charity recipients. We propose that donors hold simultaneous, yet incongruent 
preferences of wanting to support beautiful recipients (who tend to be judged as less needy) yet 
believing they should support needy recipients instead. We additionally posit that preferences for 
beautiful recipients are most likely to emerge when decisions are intuitive whereas preferences 
for needy recipients are most likely to emerge when decisions are deliberative. We test these 
propositions in several ways. First, when a beautiful recipient is introduced to basic choice sets, 
it becomes the most popular option and increases donor satisfaction. Second, heightening 
deliberation steers choices away from beautiful recipients and toward needier ones. Third, donors 
explicitly state that they “want” to give to beautiful recipients but “should” give to less beautiful, 
needier ones. Taken together, these findings reconcile and extend previous and sometimes 
conflicting results about beauty and generosity. 
 
Keywords: Prosocial Behavior, Altruism, Decision Making, Beauty Premium, Want versus 
Should Preferences, Intuitive versus Deliberative Decision Making 
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“Pandas are among a number of endangered animals that are sometimes classified, not 
flatteringly, as ‘charismatic megafauna,’ which attract money and attention out of proportion to 
their numbers. The British naturalist Christopher Packham once offered to ‘eat the last panda’ if 
doing so would free up funding for less photogenic species with better chances of survival 
outside zoos.” 
Owen 2013, 30 
 
Attractive donation targets, such as giant pandas, often receive the lion’s share of 
charitable contributions in the animal world, whereas needier but less photogenic creatures, such 
as the pygmy sloth, remain neglected (IUCN Red List 2014). This is one example of donation 
patterns that tend to overlook the world’s neediest recipients; for example, of the more than $350 
billion donated in the United States in 2014, only 4% went directly to international affairs, a 
fundraising category that encompasses the developing world where the most pressing human 
needs exist (Giving USA 2015; UNICEF 2014). 
In this research, we propose one reason why the neediest recipients may be overlooked: 
donors are swayed by recipient beauty. People naturally ascribe favorable qualities, and grant 
disproportionate benefits, to beautiful individuals in a phenomenon known as the “beauty 
premium” (Dion, Berscheid, and Walster 1972; Langlois et al. 2000). In the prosocial domain, 
however, a preference for beautiful recipients could lead to puzzling allocation choices. 
Perceptions of beauty and neediness are often negatively correlated (Fisher and Ma 2014; 
Langlois et al. 2000; Zaatari, Palestis, and Trivers 2009); therefore, a focus on beauty could 
result in neglect of the neediest individuals. 
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Previous research on recipient beauty and charitable giving shows seemingly 
contradictory patterns: some findings indicate that donors prefer beautiful recipients (Mims, 
Hartnett, and Nay 1975; West and Brown 1975), whereas other findings indicate that donors 
prefer less beautiful, needier recipients (Fisher and Ma 2014). In the current research, we attempt 
to understand the psychology behind both patterns. We posit that donors hold simultaneous, yet 
incongruent preferences including that they want to give to beautiful recipients but think they 
should give to needy recipients instead. In line with this notion, we find that when donors make 
decisions intuitively, their want preference for beautiful recipients emerges, whereas when they 
make decisions deliberatively, their should preference for needy recipients emerges. As we 
consider in a final discussion, the present findings allow insight into why the neediest recipients 
may often not receive priority in the real world. 
 
RECIPIENT NEEDINESS AS A CRITERION FOR GIVING 
 
Proponents of the nascent “effective altruism” movement, including the renowned 
philosopher Peter Singer, endorse the notion that donors should allocate their funds to the causes 
that prevent the most suffering (MacAskill 2015; Singer 2009, 2013). This often means donating 
to recipients in the developing world, where people’s standards of living are the lowest and the 
incidence of preventable death is the highest (GiveWell 2013; UNICEF 2014). 
Recipient neediness does not take precedence in the philosophical realm alone. A similar 
preference for the neediest recipients emerges from individuals’ explicitly stated donation 
criteria. We asked 228 Mechanical Turk participants (145 female, 83 male; MAge = 30) to 
generate an open-ended answer to the question “If multiple individuals needed help and you 
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were deciding which one to donate to, what would be the single most important thing you would 
consider when deciding which person to donate to?” Results, coded by research assistants blind 
to this paper’s hypotheses, showed that 56% of participants spontaneously answered that 
recipient neediness was the most important consideration. In comparison, the next most popular 
consideration was the potential impact of the donation, receiving 20% of responses; all other 
possible answers each received less than a 5% endorsement. 
Despite the common conviction that recipient neediness is the most important 
consideration for allocations, this criterion does not seem to receive priority in practice. A small 
fraction of donated dollars go to individuals in life-or-death situations (Giving USA 2015), 
though many such individuals exist (UNICEF 2014). 
Previous research sheds light on several important factors besides recipient neediness that 
influence donation decisions. These include donors’ sympathy for the recipient (Loewenstein and 
Small 2007; Wispé 1986), donors’ personal experiences (Ratner and Miller 2001; Small and 
Simonsohn 2008), donors’ need for emotional satisfaction (Andreoni 1990; Cialdini et al. 1987; 
Dunn, Aknin, and Norton 2008), and donors’ desire to maintain a positive image via both social 
and self-approval (Batson 1998; Cain, Dana, and Newman 2014). 
Yet another factor that we hypothesize sways donor’s choices away from the neediest 
recipients is recipients’ aesthetic appeal. This hypothesis stems from research about the “beauty 
premium,” a phenomenon in which beautiful individuals receive more favorable judgments and 
benefits than their less beautiful counterparts. 
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THE BEAUTY PREMIUM 
 
In a seminal study, Dion, Berscheid, and Walster (1972) showed that people attribute 
more positive qualities to attractive than to unattractive others, and more negative qualities to 
unattractive than to attractive others. This “beauty premium” is confirmed by numerous findings 
demonstrating that facial attractiveness positively influences judgments by both familiar and 
unfamiliar perceivers in multiple domains and across cultures (Langlois et al. 2000; Miller 
1970). More attractive children and adults are considered to be healthier and fitter, to have 
greater social appeal, to have higher academic competence, and to be more confident and better 
adjusted than their less attractive counterparts (Landy and Sigall 1974; Langlois et al. 2000; 
Mobius and Rosenblat 2006). More attractive individuals also are more successful in their 
attempts at persuasion (Landry et al. 2005) and receive sizable wage premiums compared to less 
attractive individuals (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). 
There are two dominant explanations regarding why the beauty premium occurs. One 
explanation is rooted in an evolutionary perspective that centers on reproductive selection and 
fitness. This evolutionary account proposes that a preference for beauty arises because beauty is 
a signal of traits such as health, athleticism, and intelligence, which are important for fertility 
and/or survival (Buss and Schmitt 1993; Langlois et al. 2000; Mobius and Rosenblatt 2006). 
A second explanation proposes a more instinctive connection between beauty and 
favorable judgments. This account suggests that people simply have a taste, or predilection, for 
beauty even when fitness or beliefs about fitness are unrelated (Becker 1957; Hamermesh and 
Biddle 1994; Mulford et al. 1998; Newman and Bloom 2012). Such a taste-based preference for 
beauty has been posited to be automatic and affective at its core (Reimann et al. 2010) and to 
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arise as a by-product of information processing within the human brain (Rhodes 2006). Factors 
that are correlated with attractiveness, such as symmetry, are desirable not just for human faces 
but for many other stimuli, such as birds and wristwatches (Halberstadt and Rhodes 2000; 
Kubovy 2000). In the consumer domain, this innate draw toward beauty is manifested by 
favorable responses to aesthetic designs, including a desire to own an attractive product (Norman 
2004) and to pay more for it (Bloch, Brunel, and Arnold 2003), even in categories such as 
finance for which aesthetics are deemed to be irrelevant (Townsend and Shu 2010). 
An appreciation for beauty not only increases the likelihood that people choose more 
attractive options but also results in higher satisfaction among people who do so. Visually 
beautiful stimuli activate reward centers in the brain (Aharon et al. 2001), elicit intense positive 
emotional responses (Leder et al. 2004; Reimann et al. 2010), and generate pleasurable 
subjective experiences (Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004; Townsend and Sood 2012). 
 
WANT VERSUS SHOULD PREFERENCES IN CHARITABLE GIVING 
 
In the domain of charitable giving, an instinctive and gratifying preference for beauty 
could lead to puzzling allocation choices. Physically attractive people are perceived to be more 
competent, popular, and successful than their less attractive counterparts (Langlois et al. 2000) 
and, accordingly, should be perceived as less in need of help. Indeed, Zaatari, Palestis, and 
Trivers (2009) find that proposers in an ultimatum game rate the most attractive respondents as 
the least needy. Similarly, Fisher and Ma (2014) find that more attractive donation recipients are 
perceived to be less needy than less attractive recipients. Our own data reveal a similar pattern; 
in a correlational study, Mechanical Turk participants (N = 224) rated 1 of 20 charity recipient 
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photos from a fundraising website on dimensions of attractiveness and neediness. The set of 
photos included pictures of 13 women and 7 men across a variety of adult ages and ethnicities. 
We observe a significant negative correlation, r = −21, p < .01, between ratings of attractiveness 
and neediness. 
An instinctive draw to beautiful recipients might therefore be at odds with donors’ 
explicitly held belief that individuals in the greatest need should receive altruistic priority. In this 
research, we propose that this incongruence exists because donors simultaneously hold two 
distinct preferences: a want preference for beautiful recipients and a should preference for needy 
recipients (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni 1998; Bitterly, Dai, and Milkman 2014; 
Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman 2008, 2009). 
Previous research conceptualizes want preferences as those that are affect-rich and, 
sometimes, linked with desire (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni 1998; Loewenstein 
1996) and should preferences as those that are reason-based, logical, and more easily justified 
(Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni 1998).
1
 For example, when choosing movies, 
consumers may hold a want preference to watch a comedy but a should preference to watch a 
documentary (Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman 2009). In the charity domain, we hypothesize 
that if humans have an automatic and gratifying preference for beautiful stimuli, they may 
intuitively want to give to beautiful charity recipients, even if they deliberately believe that they 
should give to needy recipients. Beautiful recipients offer intuitive appeal and immediate 
satisfaction, whereas needy recipients fit with a reasoned priority to help the most desperate 
individuals. 
 We further propose that donors’ want preferences for beautiful recipients are most likely 
to emerge when they choose intuitively, whereas donors’ should preferences for needy recipients 
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are most likely to emerge when they choose deliberatively. Research from a breadth of 
psychology disciplines recognizes distinctions in cognitive functioning between “System 1” 
processing, or intuitive processing that depends on automatic associations, and “System 2” 
processing, or deliberative processing that depends on logical reasoning (Stanovich and West 
2000). Processes under System 1 operate quickly, rely on seemingly effortless associations to 
inform judgments, and tend to favor affect-rich options. Processes under System 2, by contrast, 
operate slowly and rely on effortful cognition to reach reasoned conclusions (Chaiken and Trope 
1999; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Milkman, Chugh, and Bazerman 2009). 
Because preferences for beautiful recipients may arise from automatic, instinctive 
preferences, we predict that they will be most likely to emerge when donors process information 
intuitively via System 1. In contrast, because we posit that preferences for needy recipients arise 
on the basis of reason, we predict that they are most likely to emerge when donors process 
information deliberatively via System 2. These predictions are consistent with previous research 
implicating a dual-system model of information processing in want versus should preferences 
(Bitterly et al. 2014; Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman 2008). The intuitive System 1 is reward 
seeking and often oriented toward what feels good, whereas the deliberative System 2 is rule 
based and oriented toward what is appropriate and sensible (Epstein 1994; Shiv and Fedorikhin 
1999). 
Understanding a distinction between donors’ intuitively versus deliberately derived 
preferences could shed light on discrepancies that exist in the altruism literature. Some past 
research finds, for example, that attractive people are more likely to receive help than 
unattractive people (Mims, Hartnett, and Nay 1975; West and Brown 1975). In contrast, other 
research finds that unattractive people are more likely to receive help than attractive people 
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(Fisher and Ma 2014). To reconcile these inconsistent findings, we propose that donors hold 
simultaneous yet contradictory preferences that are cued by different information-processing 
modes: when donors decide intuitively, they are more likely to select beautiful recipients in line 
with their want preferences; when donors decide deliberatively, they are more likely to select 
needy recipients in line with their should preferences. 
We test these propositions across eight studies. Studies 1A through 1C explore what 
happens to donors’ choices and satisfaction when beautiful options are included in basic choice 
sets, and document a preference for beautiful options. Studies 2 through 4 test the proposition 
that increasing deliberation shifts preferences away from beautiful recipients and toward needy 
recipients. Study 5 examines how very high levels of perceived need, and associated high 
empathy, weaken the charity beauty premium. Finally, Study 6 demonstrates that donors’ 
preferences for beautiful versus needy recipients specifically represent want versus should 
preferences. Throughout, we attempt to understand the psychology underlying donors’ 
preferences for beautiful versus needy recipients and, in the process, shed new light on previous 
findings in this domain. 
 
STUDY 1A 
 
Study 1A is a field study that solicited donations for an animal conservation center in the 
UK. The conservation center sells animal adoption packages that include receipt of a paper leaf 
inscribed with the donor’s name that is placed on the center’s adoption tree. While all species on 
the conservation center’s website need funds, each species’ conservation status differs because 
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some animals are more critically endangered than others. We test how judgments of beauty and 
endangerment predict donations to different animal species. 
Pretest 
One hundred seven university graduate and undergraduate students rated images of eight 
animals from the conservation center’s adoption webpage on beauty and perceived 
endangerment (1–10 scales; Please see Web Appendix A for photos); order of image and 
question were counterbalanced. Table 1 shows rating results as well as each animal’s actual 
endangerment status as determined by a prominent conservation organization (IUCN 2015). 
***** Insert Table 1 about here ***** 
Main Study 
Simulating the conservation center’s adoption packages, a poster featuring a tree was 
placed in the foyer of a busy university building in the UK. The poster included the message 
“Support [conservation center] today. Join our Support Tree! [conservation center] contributes to 
animal conservation.” Students, staff, and visitors passing by were asked if they would like to 
donate to support animal conservation. Those who were interested viewed a booklet with the 
animal images from the pretest and chose an animal to support. Donors could then write their 
name on a paper leaf and append the leaf to the poster. The suggested donation amount was 20 
pence (approximately $.30) per paper leaf, but donors were free to donate more both to the same 
animal and to different ones. Donations were collected for five consecutive days. 
 
Results 
Pretest. The giraffe and the zebra were rated the most beautiful and least endangered 
animals, whereas the penguin and orangutan were rated the least beautiful and most severely 
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endangered; these endangerment ratings were in line with actual endangerment status as 
determined by the IUCN Red List (2015; see Table 1). 
Main study. The giraffe and the zebra, rated the most beautiful animals in the pretest, 
received a significantly greater percentage of sponsorships than the two least beautiful animals, 
the penguin and orangutan (which also were correctly perceived as being more severely 
endangered), 32% versus 17% respectively, χ2 = 4.79, p < .03.  A similar test comparing 
sponsorships for the four most beautiful versus least beautiful animals showed that the former 
were selected significantly more often than the latter (64% versus 36% respectively, χ2 = 7.04, p 
< .01; see Figure 1). The same test conducted with the four most versus least endangered species, 
determined either by actual endangerment status or by participants’ ratings of perceived 
endangerment, showed no such difference (actual endangerment: High = 47% vs. Low = 53%, χ2 
= .38, p = .54, perceived endangerment: High = 48% vs. Low = 52%, χ2 =.17, p = .68). 
***** Insert Figure 1 about here ***** 
Discussion 
 Study 1A provides initial field evidence that beautiful recipients can be preferred even 
when they do not have the highest need. Study 1B explores this pattern further, incorporating an 
experimental test. 
 
STUDY 1B 
 
 Study 1B experimentally tested how adding a beautiful recipient to a basic choice set 
changes donors’ preferences and satisfaction. All participants viewed images of four children 
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who had received successful cleft palate surgery via the charity Smile Train, and chose which 
child they would sponsor. 
Pretest 
Four hundred eighty-one Mechanical Turk participants (229 male, 252 female; MAge = 
36) rated four children on attractiveness (“cuteness”) and neediness. One child (Angelica) was 
rated as significantly cuter than any of the other four children (MAngelica = 4.08, MVera = 3.03, 
MMaria = 3.00, MSilva = 2.86, MYaoLin = 2.83; ps < .0005). Angelica also was rated as significantly 
less needy than the other four (MAngelica = 2.57, MVera = 3.16, MMaria = 2.95, MSilva = 3.06, MYaoLin 
= 3.06; ps < .0005); one child, Vera, also consistently was rated as needier than the remaining 
three children (vs. Maria, p < .0005; vs. Silva, p < .05; vs. Yao Lin, p < .06).
2
 
Main Study 
Method. Three hundred sixty Mechanical Turk participants (173 female, 187 male, MAge 
= 32) participated in exchange for a small payment.
3
 Participants were presented, in random 
order, with the pretested pictures of four children who had been helped by Smile Train and read 
that these children needed financial support to move on with their lives after cleft palate surgery. 
The children were described as approximately the same age (1–2 years) and from the same 
region of the world (Central and South America). 
 The experiment included Control and Beauty conditions. In the Control condition, 
participants viewed the four children who, according to the pretest, were similar in attractiveness 
(Vera, Maria, Silva, and Yao Lin). In the Beauty condition, the child rated as significantly more 
beautiful and less needy than the others, Angelica, was substituted for Yao Lin; to maintain 
experimental control, the name “Angelica” was used in both conditions. 
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Participants then selected a child as if they were actually sponsoring her. Next, they 
answered follow-up questions about how happy, pleased, and content they felt as a result of their 
choice; these items were combined into a single “satisfaction” score (α = .89). 
Results. An omnibus chi-square test revealed a significant difference between conditions 
in sponsorship choices, χ2(4, N = 360) = 33.0, p < .001 (see Figure 2). Participants in the Control 
condition, who did not consider a clearly beautiful option, showed a preference for Vera, the 
neediest child, over all others (Vera, 45%; Maria, 22%, p = .001; Yao Lin, 20%; p < .001; Silva, 
14%, p < .001; all p-values relative to Vera’s choice share). 
***** Insert Figure 2 about here ***** 
 Results differed in the Beauty condition. Participants in the Beauty condition, who 
instead of Yao Lin considered Angelica, the most beautiful and least needy child according to the 
pre-test, chose Angelica more often than any other child (Angelica = 48%, Vera = 30%, p = .01; 
Maria = 12%, p < .001; Silva = 10%, p < .0001; all p-values relative to Angelica’s choice share). 
In this Beauty condition, compared to Control, participants also were less likely to choose Vera, 
the child perceived as the neediest (30% vs. 45%, z(359) = 2.92, p < .01). 
 In addition to selecting Angelica more often than any other option, participants in the 
Beauty condition reported greater satisfaction with their choice than did those in the Control 
condition, MBeauty = 3.60, MControl = 3.27, t(358) = 2.40, p < .02. 
Discussion 
Results from Study 1B are consistent with several past findings about beauty and 
generosity (Mims, Hartnett, and Nay 1975; West and Brown 1975): when a beautiful recipient is 
present, donors are more generous toward that beautiful recipient. Further, we observe that not 
only do donors choose a beautiful recipient when one is present, but they also are more satisfied 
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with their choice, supporting the notion that beauty is gratifying. In contrast, when no beautiful 
option is present, donors gravitate toward the neediest recipient, in line with their explicit 
prioritization of neediness. Study 1C continues to explore this pattern with novel stimuli and 
decision types.
4
 
 
STUDY 1C 
 
 Study 1C tests donors’ reactions to recipients who are more beautiful versus less 
beautiful using a different approach from Study 1B. Donors in Study 1C viewed a single 
recipient instead of several, considered donating to an adult instead of to a child, considered a 
photo of the same person that had been edited via photo software to be more versus less 
beautiful, and made real donations. The new study design also allowed follow-up questions 
measuring perceptions of facial expression so that we could control for this factor. 
Pretest 
Pretest participants recruited from Mechanical Turk (n = 285; 172 female, 113 male, one 
gender unknown; MAge = 33) rated a photo of either a man (“Evan”) or a woman (“Andrea”) 
from a fundraising website. In the Beauty condition, participants saw the original, attractive, 
photo of one of these two individuals. In the Control condition, the photos were edited, 
introducing asymmetries to make them less attractive. 
Participants were randomly assigned to view one of the four photos. Each participant 
rated the photo on the same dimensions (beauty/handsomeness and neediness) used in Study 1B, 
using 5-point scales. The two Beauty condition photos were rated more “beautiful or handsome” 
(Andrea: MBeauty = 3.85, MControl = 2.77, t(134) = 7.58, p < .0005; Evan: MBeauty = 3.29, MControl = 
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2.30, t(147) = 6.20, p < .0005) and less needy (Andrea: MBeauty = 1.82, MControl = 2.35, t(135) = 
3.75, p < .0005; Evan: MBeauty = 1.82, MControl = 2.15, t(147) = 2.30, p < .03) than the two Control 
condition photos. 
Main Study 
Method. Two hundred thirty-eight adults (134 female, 104 male; MAge = 33) participated 
online via Mechanical Turk. After reading initial instructions, participants learned that they 
would receive a 25-cent bonus that they could donate to charity as part of the study. 
The study included two between-subjects experimental conditions (Control, Beauty) with 
recipient gender randomized within each condition. All participants read that they could donate 
to a recovered bone cancer patient who was seeking financial help. In the Beauty condition, 
participants saw the original photo of either an attractive man or an attractive woman from a 
fundraising website. In the Control condition, participants saw an edited, less attractive version 
of the same man or woman. Donors decided whether to donate their $.25 bonus to the recipient 
or not. 
Following procedures from Study 1B, participants then rated how happy, pleased, and 
content they felt as a result of considering the donation request (“satisfaction” score α = .90) as 
well as how happy, sad, needy, and beautiful the recipient looked. 
Results. Participants were more likely to donate in the Beauty condition (59%) than in the 
Control condition (45%, χ2(1, N = 238) = 4.45, p < .05). This effect did not differ between 
female and male photos (p > .9); moving forward we collapse results across recipient gender. 
The beauty effect remained significant when controlling for the recipient’s judged 
happiness, sadness, neediness, or all three measures at once (in simultaneous logistic regressions, 
ps < .05). When controlling for perceived beauty of the recipient, however, the effect of beauty 
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became non-significant (p > .2); this result is consistent with the notion that perceived beauty, 
but not facial expression, drives donation differences between the Beauty and Control conditions.  
A simultaneous mediation analysis confirmed that perceived beauty uniquely accounted 
for the influence of beauty on donations. We conducted a bootstrapping mediation analysis with 
5,000 samples using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS Macro (Model 4), which included measures of 
perceived happiness, sadness, neediness, and beauty. Only perceived beauty significantly 
mediated the relationship between the Beauty condition and donation choice, 95% CI = .15–.63. 
In this model, the direct effect was no longer significant (p = .09), and no other potential 
mediators were significant (ps > .2). We note that this particular mediation analysis does not 
suggest a psychological mediator for the charity beauty premium (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010) 
but instead serves as a rigorous manipulation check. 
Participants also reported marginally significantly greater satisfaction in the Beauty 
condition than in the Control condition (MBeauty = 3.27, MControl = 2.98, t(235) = 1.93, p < .06). A 
simultaneous mediation model analogous to the one described above confirmed that perceived 
beauty uniquely accounted for the influence of the Beauty condition on satisfaction, 95% CI = 
.12–.40. In this analysis, the direct effect was no longer significant (p = .91), and no other 
potential mediators, including facial expression, were significant. 
Discussion 
In Study 1A, donors were more likely to sponsor beautiful animals, even when beautiful 
animals were not the most endangered. In Study 1B, donors selected the neediest child as long as 
a beautiful (but less needy) recipient was not an option; once a beautiful recipient was an option, 
she became the most popular recipient and increased donor satisfaction (see also Web Appendix 
B). In Study 1C, this preference for a beautiful recipient, and the subsequent greater donation 
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satisfaction, persisted when participants made real donations to a single adult recipient, and it 
was not explained by recipients’ facial expression. 
  Although a preference for beautiful recipients is consistent with some prior evidence 
about beauty and giving (Mims, Hartnett, and Nay 1975; West and Brown 1975), it is not 
consistent with donors’ explicit statements (reported in our initial survey) that neediness is the 
most important criterion for charitable allocations. It is also not consistent with recent evidence 
that finds the opposite pattern, namely, that less attractive recipients receive more donations 
(Fisher and Ma 2014, Study 4). 
A common feature of Studies 1A through 1C is that participants’ decisions were 
relatively intuitive. Studies 1A and 1B involved a sponsorship selection from a small set of 
pictures; Study 1C included a simple yes/no choice of whether to donate a bonus payment. 
Previous research documenting a beauty premium in prosocial domains also relied on choices 
that are likely intuitive, such as whether agreeing or not to help an attractive, versus unattractive, 
experimenter with an additional task (Mims, Hartnett, and Nay 1975). 
In this research, we propose that intuitive versus deliberative decision modes can lead to 
diverging recipient preferences. More specifically, we hypothesize that intuitive processing leads 
to preferences for beautiful recipients whereas deliberative, cognitively effortful processing leads 
to preferences for needy recipients. Studies 2 through 4 directly test this hypothesis. 
 
STUDY 2 
 
Study 2 tests whether intuitive versus deliberative decision modes influence the charity 
beauty premium by directly asking participants to let either deliberation or intuition guide a 
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charity recipient choice. We predict that when deciding intuitively, participants will prefer the 
most beautiful recipient, but when deciding deliberatively, they will not. 
Method. Two hundred forty Mechanical Turk participants (139 female, 101 male; MAge = 
33) participated online in exchange for a small payment. Participants first read the scenario from 
Study 1B. In the Intuitive condition, participants also read, “Please make a quick choice, letting 
intuition guide which child you would sponsor. Be sure to rely on your instincts.” In the 
Deliberative condition, participants read, “Please think carefully about your choice, thoroughly 
considering which child you would sponsor. Be sure to rely on logical deliberation.” All 
participants then viewed the photos from the Beauty condition from Study 1B (excluding any 
additional text such as names). Participants first chose a child to sponsor and then rated to what 
extent their sponsorship choice was based on intuition versus deliberation (1–5 rating scale with 
1 = “entirely on intuition” and 5 = “entirely on deliberation”). We also measured participants’ 
response time from when they loaded the survey screen with recipient photos until they made the 
final decision click on the same screen. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Participants in the Deliberative condition indicated that their choice 
was based more on deliberation than did participants in the Intuitive condition (MDeliberative = 
3.06, MIntuitive = 2.05, t(238) = 7.62, p < .0005). Response time in seconds also was higher in the 
Deliberative condition than in the Intuitive condition (MedDeliberative = 20.76, MedIntuitive = 11.59, 
Mann-Whitney U = 3,600, p < .0005). 
Main results. An omnibus chi-square test revealed a marginally significant difference 
between conditions in sponsorship choices, χ2(3, N = 240) = 7.36, p = .06 (see Figure 3). 
Participants in the Intuitive condition showed a preference for Angelica, the most attractive and 
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least needy of the four children according to the Study 1B pre-test (Angelica, 49%; Vera, 23%, p 
< .001; Maria, 12%, p < .0001; Silva, 16%, p < .0001; all p-values relative to Angelica’s choice 
share). 
***** Insert Figure 3 about here ***** 
 
In the Deliberative condition, Angelica was no longer a favorite (Angelica, 33%; Vera, 
28%, p = .55; Maria, 18%, p < .05; Silva, 22%, p = .13; all p-values relative to Angelica’s choice 
share). In the Deliberative condition, compared to the Intuitive condition, participants were less 
likely to choose Angelica, the most beautiful and least needy recipient, for their allocation 
decision (33% vs. 49%, z(239) = 2.63, p < .01); consequently, they were more likely to choose 
needier recipients. 
Discussion 
In Study 2, when donors decided intuitively, they were most likely to choose a beautiful 
recipient; however, an explicit request to choose deliberatively eliminated this preference. In the 
Deliberative condition, preferences shifted toward the less beautiful, but needier, recipients 
instead, providing initial evidence that the charity beauty premium emerges from intuitive, but 
not deliberative, decisions. 
 
STUDY 3 
 
In Study 3, we use an alternative method to manipulate deliberation. We draw upon 
findings that decision makers rely more heavily on logic and deliberation when they make 
choices for others compared to when they make choices for themselves. For example, consumers 
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are less loss averse when choosing for others than when choosing for themselves (Polman 2012), 
and they seek greater variety when choosing for others because it is a more objectively 
compelling strategy (Choi et al. 2006; Ratner and Kahn 2002). 
In Study 3, we manipulate whether donors make a sponsorship choice for themselves or 
on behalf of someone else while serving as an adviser. We predict that asking donors to serve as 
advisers, and thus choosing on behalf of someone else, will encourage them to override intuitive 
preferences for beauty in favor of deliberative preferences for neediness. 
Method 
Two hundred sixty-four participants from Mechanical Turk (105 female, 159 male; MAge 
= 32) participated online in exchange for a small payment. Participants read the scenario from 
Study 1B. In the Intuitive condition, participants chose one child to support as a sponsor. In the 
Deliberative condition, participants served as an adviser, choosing “which child will be 
sponsored by an anonymous donor.” All participants viewed the same pictures and short 
recipient descriptions from the Beauty condition from Study 1B and chose a child, in the role 
either of sponsor (Intuitive condition) or adviser (Deliberative condition). 
Results 
An omnibus chi-square test revealed a difference between conditions in sponsorship 
choices χ2(4, N = 264) = 8.99, p = .06 (see Figure 4). Participants in the Intuitive condition 
sponsored Angelica, the most attractive and least needy of the four children, most often 
(Angelica, 42%; Vera, 25%, p < .03; Mariana, 20%, p = .001; Silva, 12%, p < .0001; all p-values 
relative to Angelica’s choice share). 
***** Insert Figure 4 about here ***** 
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In the Deliberative condition, in which participants served as an adviser, Angelica was no 
longer the favorite (Angelica, 30%; Vera, 39%, p = .24; Mariana, 18%, p < .05; Silva, 13%, p < 
.01; all p-values relative to Angelica’s choice share). In the Deliberative condition, compared to 
the Intuitive condition, participants were less likely to choose Angelica for their allocation 
decision (30% vs. 42%, z(263) = 2.04, p < .05), and they were also more likely to choose Vera, 
the neediest child (39% vs. 25%, z(263) = 2.45, p < .05). 
In a posttest, we verified that making sponsorship choices on behalf of someone else 
prompts deliberation compared to making sponsorship choices for oneself. Previous research has 
shown that accountability to others can heighten expectations of justifying one’s decision (Lerner 
and Tetlock 1999) and induce controlled information processing (Bazerman et al. 1998). Thus, 
we asked 113 Mechanical Turk participants to read either the Intuitive or the Deliberative 
scenario and to rate the extent to which they would expect to need to justify the decision to 
others. Participants who read the Deliberative condition scenario were more likely to anticipate 
justifying their choice than were participants who read the Intuitive condition scenario 
(MDeliberative = 2.66, MIntuitive = 1.98, t(111) = 2.97, p < .01). 
Discussion 
In Study 3, donors who were placed in a more deliberative state by serving as advisers 
were less likely to choose Angelica, the most attractive but least needy recipient. These 
participants also were more likely to act in line with an explicit prioritization of neediness by 
choosing Vera, the child who was rated as needier than the others. 
We note that the current result is incompatible with the notion that donors choose 
beautiful recipients because beautiful individuals are more worthy or more promising. If 
expectations of beautiful recipients’ success drive the charity beauty premium, then we should 
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observe it both when participants make sponsorship choices for themselves and when they make 
sponsorship recommendations to others. However, we observe that when participants serve as 
advisers, the charity beauty premium weakens and, in fact, reverses; this pattern is consistent 
with an account that donors prefer beautiful recipients because of an intuitive preference for 
aesthetic appeal and not because these recipients are justified to be more likely to succeed.  
Study 4 tests an additional way of increasing deliberation: asking participants to rate 
recipients on several dimensions before making sponsorship choices. 
 
STUDY 4 
 
 Previous research documenting that donors allocate more funds to less attractive, needier 
recipients than to more attractive, less needy recipients finds this pattern after participants first 
explicitly rate charity recipients on several dimensions including neediness, attractiveness, and 
empathy (Fisher and Ma 2014, Study 4). It is possible that such a rating task encourages 
participants to thoroughly consider recipients, prompting deliberative decision making. In Study 
4, we directly manipulate whether such a rating task steers donors toward a deliberative choice of 
needy recipients and away from an intuitive choice of beautiful recipients. 
Study 4 includes an Intuitive condition identical to that in Study 3 and also includes a 
new Deliberative condition in which, before making sponsorship choices, participants explicitly 
rate each recipient on dimensions identical to those measured by Fisher and Ma (2014): 
attractiveness, emotional expression, social competence, perceived need, and empathy. 
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Method 
 Three hundred six Mechanical Turk participants (189 female, 117 male; MAge = 33) 
completed the study in exchange for a small payment. The experiment included two conditions: 
the Intuitive condition from Study 3 and a new Deliberative condition in which participants rated 
each child on attractiveness (three items, 5-points scales), emotional expression (four items, 5-
point scales), social competence (seven items, 5-point scales), perceived need (four items, 5-
points scales), and empathy (five items, 7-point scales), all following procedures used by Fisher 
and Ma (2014), before making their sponsorship choice. 
Results 
Rating results. Similar to the pretest described before Study 1B, participants in the 
Deliberative condition, who rated each child on multiple dimensions before making the 
allocation choice, rated Angelica as more attractive (MAngelica = 4.20, MVera = 3.42, MMaria = 3.43, 
MSilva = 3.39, ps < .0005) and less needy (MAngelica = 2.39, MVera = 3.28, MMaria = 2.80, MSilva = 
3.10, ps < .0005) than any of the other three children; they also judged Vera to be needier than 
any of the other three children, ps < .0005). In addition, participants reported either directionally 
or significantly less empathy for Angelica (MAngelica = 5.23, MVera = 5.52, p < .0005; MMaria = 
5.32, p = .19, MSilva = 5.38, p = .05) and significantly more empathy for Vera compared to the 
other children (ps < .01). These empathy ratings are consistent with the central finding from 
Fisher and Ma (2014, Studies 1–3) that participants express more empathy for a less beautiful 
than for a more beautiful charity recipient.
5
 
Main results. An omnibus chi-square test showed a difference between conditions when 
choosing which child to support, χ2(3, N = 304) = 12.30, p < .01 (see Figure 5). 
***** Insert Figure 5 about here ***** 
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In between-subjects comparisons, participants in the Deliberative condition were less 
likely to choose Angelica, the most beautiful recipient, than were participants in the Intuitive 
condition (21% vs. 39%, z(302) = 3.42, p < .001), and more likely to choose Vera, the neediest 
recipient (42% vs. 30%, z(302) = 2.21, p < .03). Within the Deliberative condition, Vera was 
selected the most frequently (Vera, 42%; Angelica, 21%, p < .001; Mariana, 20%, p < .0005; 
Silva, 18%, p <.0005; all p-values relative to Vera’s choice share), whereas within the Intuitive 
condition, Angelica was selected the most frequently (Angelica, 39%; Vera, 30%, p = .23; Maria, 
18%, p < .0005; Silva, 13%, p < .0005; all p-values relative to Angelica’s choice share). 
Discussion 
The Deliberative condition from Study 4 demonstrates that a rating task, which prompts a 
thorough consideration of each recipient, pushes donors to choose needier, less beautiful, 
recipients. This study also sheds light on previous results by showing that such a rating task can 
trigger a reversal of the charity beauty premium (Fisher and Ma 2014; Study 4). Although donors 
gravitate toward beautiful recipients when choices are intuitive, increasing deliberation by asking 
participants to rate recipients on several attributes (including both beauty and neediness) steers 
them to allocate in accordance with their explicit priority of neediness. Across studies 2 through 
4, donors were more likely to choose beautiful recipients when deciding intuitively and needy 
recipients when deciding deliberatively. 
Rating results from Study 4 also show that participants report greater empathy for a less 
beautiful than for a more beautiful recipient. This result is consistent with the central finding 
from Fisher and Ma (2014, Studies 1–3). Despite greater empathy for less beautiful recipients, 
however, we find that donors choose these recipients only when the choice is deliberative, but 
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not when the choice is intuitive. In the next study, we further explore the complex role of 
empathy in the relationship between donors’ preferences for beautiful versus needy recipients. 
 
STUDY 5 
 
Study 5 explores the role of empathy in the charity beauty premium. In Study 4, we see 
that empathy only predicts giving when participants process information in a deliberative, 
System 2 mode. In many respects, this result is puzzling. Empathy and sympathy are often 
presumed to be affective responses and, therefore, associated with System 1 intuitive processing 
(Batson 1998; Loewenstein and Small 2007). Yet, empathy and sympathy are unique affective 
influences, because they also often correlate with deliberative judgments of neediness (Batson et 
al. 2005; Fisher and Ma 2014; Study 4 ratings from the current paper). Moreover, past research 
proposes a deliberative component of such sympathetic emotions (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and 
Rapson 1994). According to this account, empathy entails taking another person’s perspective, a 
process involving reflection and effort (Wispé 1986) that relies on deliberative cognition. This 
characterization of empathy is consistent with our findings thus far that donors are more likely to 
favor empathetic recipients when processing deliberatively. 
Nevertheless, empathy and sympathy have potential to activate intense affective 
responses as well. Such intense affective responses may actually oppose, and even overwhelm, 
donors’ intuitive want preference for beauty. We posit that very high levels of need may trigger 
strong emotional empathy toward recipients (Loewenstein and Small 2007; Small and Cryder 
2016), which in turn can override beauty preferences due to a competing System 1 influence. We 
test this hypothesis in Study 5. 
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Method 
Seven hundred seventy Mechanical Turk participants (438 female, 332 male; MAge = 34) 
participated in exchange for a small payment. Similar to Study 1C, participants learned that they 
would receive a 20-cent bonus that they could donate to charity during the study. 
The study included a 2 (Photo: Control, Beautiful) × 2 (Empathy: Control-Empathy, 
High-Empathy) between-subjects experimental design. The Beautiful versus Control photo 
manipulation was identical to that in Study 1C (randomizing female and male photos within 
condition). In the Control-Empathy condition, participants read the recipient description from 
Study 1C portraying a recipient who has recovered from bone cancer and is seeking financial 
help to move forward in life. In the High-Empathy condition, the recipient was described as even 
higher in need, struggling to recover from bone cancer and no longer able to work and support a 
family (please see Web Appendix C for full wording). 
As in Study 1C, the main dependent variable was whether participants decided to donate 
their participation bonus to the recipient or not, after which they responded to five items from 
Fisher and Ma (2014; see also Study 4 of the current paper) designed to measure empathy: the 
extent to which participants felt sympathetic, compassionate, softhearted, warm, and moved (1–5 
point scales, items combined for single empathy score, α = .94). 
Results 
Manipulation check. Participants in the High-Empathy condition reported greater 
empathy than did participants in the Control-Empathy condition (MHighEmpathy = 3.61, 
MControlEmpathy = 3.35, t(768) = 3.53, p < .0005). 
Main results. A binary logistic regression simultaneously tested the influence of beauty, 
empathy, and their interaction on donation likelihood. We observed a marginally significant 
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positive main effect of beauty, Exp(B) = 1.46, p = .06, and a significant positive main effect of 
empathy, Exp(B) = 1.88, p < .01. Most importantly, we observed a significant interaction 
between beauty and empathy, Exp(B) = .53, p < .03. Within the Control-Empathy condition, 
participants who saw a beautiful photo were marginally significantly more likely to donate 
(59%) than those who saw a control photo (50%, χ2(1, N = 396) = 3.4, p = .06), replicating Study 
1C’s findings. Within the High-Empathy condition, however, participants who saw a beautiful 
photo were not more likely to donate (59%) than were participants who saw a control photo 
(65%; χ2(1, N = 374) = 1.6, p > .2). 
To more firmly understand the phenomenon from Study 5, we showed a new set of 
Mechanical Turk participants (N = 72) the high empathy description from Study 5 and told them 
that it prompted many people to donate. Participants then indicated whether they thought people 
donated because of 1) logical thoughts that the person was needy, 2) emotional reactions to the 
person’s situation, or 3) other reasons (with an option to type a response; the order of the first 
two response options was counterbalanced). A strong majority, 89%, of participants indicated 
that emotional reactions drove the response, providing evidence that the high-empathy 
manipulation was indeed an affective, System 1–based manipulation. 
Discussion 
 In Study 5 we observe that, when faced with recipients in severe need, donors experience 
high empathy and a tendency to help regardless of beauty. This result complements that from 
Fisher and Ma (2014) showing that when recipient need and donor empathy are high, donors feel 
compelled to help regardless of recipient beauty. In both sets of findings, empathy overwhelms 
beauty; however, we note that the natures of these two findings differ. In the case of Fisher and 
Ma (2014, p. 438), high empathy trumps a System 2 deliberative process that favors less 
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beautiful recipients; in the present study, high empathy trumps another System 1 process, an 
instinctive preference for beauty. 
We therefore have found that multiple preference patterns can result from intuitive 
System 1 processing; first, we have observed an instinctive draw toward beauty that leads to 
feelings of happiness and satisfaction (Studies 1B and 1C); second, we have observed that very 
high levels of empathy can push donors to choose needy recipients, regardless of their beauty 
(Study 5). Because there are multiple types of preferences that can arise from intuitive (versus 
deliberative) decisions, in a final study we test whether beautiful versus needy recipients 
specifically represent donors’ want versus should preferences. 
 
STUDY 6 
 
In Studies 2 through 4 donors were more likely to choose beautiful recipients when 
deciding intuitively but more likely to choose needy recipients when deciding deliberatively. 
However, there are multiple types of preference patterns that can result from intuitive (vs. 
deliberative) decision modes (Morewedge and Kahneman 2009; Stanovich 2009), including, for 
example, stronger sensitivity to affect-rich options (Rottenstreich and Hsee 2004) or greater 
sensitivity to emotional influences like empathy (Loewenstein and Small 2007). In Study 6, we 
test whether donors’ preferences for beautiful versus needy recipients map onto their want versus 
should desires respectively. 
Method 
Two hundred and forty-eight Mechanical Turk participants (146 female, 102 male; MAge 
= 33) participated in the study online in exchange for a small payment. Participants viewed the 
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sponsorship scenario and photos from the Beauty condition from Study 1B and then answered 
two questions on the same page: “Which one of these children do you think the donors would 
want to choose?” and “Which one of these children do you think the donors should choose?” 
(the words “want” and “should” were bolded in the actual questions; cf. Milkman, Rogers, and 
Bazerman 2009). 
Results  
A within-subjects omnibus McNemar-Bowker test showed a difference between 
conditions in which child was selected, χ2(6, n = 247) = 79.8, p < .0005. When participants 
considered which child donors want to give to, they chose Angelica (54% of choice share), the 
most attractive and least needy child (Vera 24%, Maria 14%, Silva 7%, all ps < .0001 relative to 
Angelica’s choice share; see Figure 6). 
Results were different when participants considered which child donors should give to. 
With this question, Angelica was no longer the most frequent choice, now only receiving 13% of 
choice share, whereas Vera, who was previously rated as needier than the other children, was 
chosen the most frequently (Vera, 48%; Maria, 24%; Silva, 14%; all ps < .0001 relative to Vera’s 
choice share). 
In between-questions analysis, participants were more likely to choose Angelica when 
answering the “want” compared to “should” question (54% vs. 13%, z(247) = 9.67, p < .0001); 
participants were more likely to choose Vera when answering the “should” compared to “want” 
question (48% vs. 24%, z(247) = 5.57, p < .0001). 
***** Insert Figure 6 about here ***** 
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Discussion 
Study 6 lends direct support to the idea that donors choose beautiful charitable recipients 
to satisfy want preferences whereas they choose needy charitable recipients to satisfy should 
preferences. When asked which recipient donors want to choose, participants selected Angelica 
(the most beautiful, least needy recipient) most often, whereas when asked which recipient 
donors should choose, they selected Vera (the neediest recipient) most often. Participants were 
naturally able to express charity recipient preferences in want and should categories. 
We also once again see evidence that the charity beauty premium cannot be attributed to 
beliefs that beautiful recipients have more potential than their less beautiful counterparts 
(Langlois et al. 2000). If beliefs about recipient success drive the charity beauty premium, then 
participants ought to indicate that they should give to beautiful recipients. Instead, participants 
indicate that they should give to needier, but less beautiful, recipients instead. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Donors explicitly endorse neediness as a top donation priority; however, we observe that 
they often choose beautiful, less needy recipients instead. We test a hypothesis that donors 
simultaneously hold a want preference to give to beautiful recipients and a should preference to 
give to needy recipients. We further test whether preferences for beautiful recipients are most 
likely to emerge when decisions are intuitive whereas preferences for needy recipients are most 
likely to emerge when decisions are deliberative. In Studies 1A through 1C, when beautiful 
recipients are included in donation recipient choice sets, they are chosen most frequently and 
increase donor satisfaction. In Studies 2 through 4, prompting deliberative, compared to intuitive, 
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decision making eliminates the charity beauty premium and directs donors toward the neediest 
recipients. In Study 5, we observe that inducing high levels of empathy for all recipients can 
overwhelm the charity beauty premium. Finally, in Study 6, we find that the precise nature of 
donors’ preferences for beautiful versus needy recipients corresponds with their want versus 
should desires: participants explicitly state that donors want to give to beautiful recipients but at 
the same time that they should give to less beautiful, needier ones. It seems that donors hold both 
sets of preferences, and that contextual factors favoring intuitive versus deliberative processing 
drive which preferences they will act upon. 
The present research reconciles seemingly contradictory previous findings about beauty 
and giving. Although a charity beauty premium is consistent with some past research showing a 
positive effect of beauty on helping (Mims, Hartnett, and Nay 1975; West and Brown 1975), 
recent research uncovered a negative effect of beauty on empathy and helping (Fisher and Ma 
2014). We bring this work together by identifying the circumstances under which each pattern 
occurs: when decisions are intuitive, attractive recipients receive more help; when decisions are 
deliberative, unattractive recipients receive more help. 
Our findings suggest that when donors decide intuitively, charities may benefit by using 
beautiful photos, whereas when donors decide deliberatively, charities may benefit by 
emphasizing recipient neediness instead. Intuitive System 1 processing often is considered to be 
the default decision mode, routinely guiding thoughts and actions that are accepted by the 
deliberative system when processing under low effort (Evans and Stanovich 2013; Kahneman 
2011). A frequent predominance of intuition over deliberation, in combination with the present 
findings, sheds light on why needy recipients may be neglected in the real world; if donors 
predominantly process information intuitively, beauty is likely to be favored. Further, these 
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patterns suggest that charities might be best off using beautiful photos as a default unless they 
believe their donors will be particularly deliberative when choosing (though we emphasize that 
all organizations should test patterns amongst their own donors and donation contexts). 
Study 5 identifies a situation when System 1 processing does not result in a charity 
beauty premium: when emotional empathy is high, donors no longer prefer beautiful recipients. 
Although one reaction to this finding is that beauty might have minimal influence in the real 
world because of an overriding influence of strong empathy, we caution against such an 
interpretation. First, as we mention in our introduction, real world donations show that the 
highest-need causes, which have potential to trigger high levels of empathy, do not receive a 
substantial share of charitable contributions (Giving USA 2015). Second, empathy and sympathy 
are often characterized as negative emotional states (Cialdini et al. 1987; Small and Verrochi 
2009) and recent neuroimaging research that predicts real world giving finds stronger effects of 
positive rather than negative donor emotional responses (Genevsky and Knutson 2015; 
Genevsky, et al. 2013). Finally, recent field evidence suggests that donors may be adept at 
avoiding situations where they expect to feel high empathy. A fascinating field study showed 
that when Salvation Army solicitors working outside stores made a direct plea to potential 
donors, looking them in the eye and asking “please give today,” donations increased. However, 
at the same time, traffic patterns into and out of the stores where solicitors operated also changed 
so that potential donors avoided encountering the solicitor altogether (Andreoni, Rao, and 
Trachtman 2011). These results and others suggest that, once potential donors’ attention is 
captured, high empathy appeals can be effective (Dickert and Slovic 2009); however, when 
given the opportunity, potential donors may actively attempt to avoid often uncomfortable 
empathetic appeals. 
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An additional preliminary study that we conducted sounds a cautionary note about 
increasing deliberation to encourage donors to choose the neediest recipients. In this study, 
designed similarly to Study 4, participants were randomly assigned to an Intuitive condition in 
which they simply chose a recipient to sponsor, or a Deliberative condition in which they rated 
each potential recipient on neediness before selecting one to sponsor. As in Study 4, the 
Deliberative condition effectively prompted donors to select a needier, less beautiful recipient 
compared to the Intuitive condition. However, later in the same session we asked participants to 
predict how much they would donate to the overall charity organization one year from now. 
Deliberative condition participants indicated that they would donate significantly less money one 
year from now compared to those in the Intuitive condition, who had been more likely to initially 
choose beauty. In other words, participants who were prompted to choose needy recipients over 
beautiful ones did so, but showed less willingness to donate in the future. Deliberation, therefore, 
appears to be a double-edged sword in that it increases priority for the neediest causes in the 
short term but may decrease kindness in response to future requests. Choosing in favor of 
neediness might satisfy a deliberative priority but might also diminish the immediate 
gratification that individuals derive from their want charity choices, suppressing future 
generosity. Taken together, this evidence again tentatively suggests that charities might benefit 
by relying on beautiful photos unless they have a specific reason to believe their donors decide 
deliberatively when donating. 
In conclusion, scholars have attempted for many years to understand the puzzle of why 
highly important campaigns remain underfunded while other, less desperate ones receive an 
outpouring of support. One of the most notable insights from this research is that focusing on the 
large scope of a problem, a natural way to present the world’s neediest causes, can undermine 
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fundraising efforts by blocking donors’ capacity for sympathy (Kogut and Ritov 2005; Small, 
Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007; Smith, Faro, and Burson 2013) and by obscuring a donor’s sense 
of impact (Cryder, Loewenstein, and Scheines 2013; Grant 2007). In this research, we posit 
another reason why donors do not favor the world’s neediest recipients: they are drawn to 
beautiful and pleasing ones instead. We examine donors’ intuitive preference for beauty and find 
that it represents a want desire to give to instinctively pleasing targets. We posit that multiple 
other want charity preferences exist as well, including preferences to give to high-status causes 
such as prestigious universities or art museums, or personally relevant causes such as charities 
that have benefited friends or family (Small and Simonsohn 2008). We believe that 
understanding donors’ desires to give to what feels good versus what feels optimal, as well as the 
contextual factors that favor one set of preferences over the other, present a fruitful research path 
for both scientists and practitioners.  
36 
REFERENCES 
Aharon, Itzhak, Nancy Etcoff, Dan Ariely, Christopher F. Chabris, Ethan O’ Connor, and Hans 
C. Breiter (2001), “Beautiful Faces have Variable Reward Value: fMRI and Behavioral 
Evidence,” Neuron, 32 (3), 537–51. 
Andreoni, James (1990), “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving,” The Economic Journal, 100 (401), 464–77. 
———, Justin M. Rao, and Hannah Trachtman (2011), “Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment 
on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 
No. w17648. 
Batson, C. Daniel (1991), The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-psychology Answer, New 
York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
——— (1998), “Altruism and Prosocial Behavior,” The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 
Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, eds. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
282–316. 
———, David A. Lishner, Jennifer Cook, and Stacey Sawyer (2005), “Similarity and 
Nurturance: Two Possible Sources of Empathy for Strangers,” Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 27 (1), 15–25. 
Bazerman, Max H., Ann E. Tenbrunsel, and Kimberly Wade-Benzoni (1998), “Negotiating with 
Yourself and Losing: Making Decisions with Competing Internal Preferences,” Academy 
of Management Review, 23 (2), 225–41. 
Bitterly, T. Bradford, Robert Mislavsky, Hengchen Dai, and Katherine L. Milkman (2014), 
“Dueling with Desire: A Synthesis of Past Research on Want/Should Conflict,” Available 
at SSRN 2403021. 
37 
Bloch, Peter H., Frederic F. Brunel, and Todd J. Arnold, (2003), “Individual Differences in the 
Centrality of Visual Product Aesthetics: Concept and Measurement,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 29 (4), 551–65. 
Buss, David, and David Schmidt (1993), “Sexual Strategies Theory: An Evolutionary 
Perspective on Human Mating,” Psychological Review, 100 (2), 204–32. 
Cain, Daylian M., Jason Dana, and George E. Newman (2014), “Giving vs. Giving In,” Academy 
of Management Annals, 8, 505–33. 
Chaiken, Shelly, and Yaacov Trope (1999), Dual-process Theories in Social Psychology, New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Choi, Jinhee, B. Kyu Kim, Incheol Choi, and Youjae Yi (2006), “Variety-seeking Tendency in 
Choice for Others: Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Causes,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 32 (4), 590–95. 
Cialdini, Robert B., Mark Schaller, Donald Houlihan, Kevin Arps, Jim Fultz, and Arthur L. 
Beaman (1987), “Empathy-based Helping: Is it Selflessly or Selfishly motivated?” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 749–58. 
Cryder, Cynthia E., George Loewenstein and Richard Scheines (2013), “The Donor is in the 
Details,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 15–23. 
Dion, Karen K., Ellen Berscheid, and Elaine Walster (1972), “What is Beautiful is Good,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24 (3), 285–90. 
Dunn, Elizabeth W., Lara B. Aknin, and Michael I. Norton (2008), “Spending Money on Others 
Promotes Happiness,” Science, 319 (5870), 1687–88. 
Evans, Jonathan S. B., and Keith E. Stanovich (2013), “Dual-process Theories of Higher 
Cognition Advancing the Debate,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8 (3), 223–41. 
38 
Fisher, Robert J., and Yu Ma (2014), “The Price of Being Beautiful: Negative Effects of 
Attractiveness on Empathy for Children in Need,” Journal of Consumer Research, 41 (2), 
436–50. 
Genevsky, Alexander, and Brian Knutson (2015), “Neural Affective Mechanisms Predict 
Market-level Microlending,” Psychological Science, 26 (9), 1411–22. 
Genevsky, Alexander, Daniel Västfjäll, Paul Slovic, and Brian Knutson (2013), “Neural 
Underpinnings of the Identifiable Victim Effect: Affect Shifts Preferences for Giving,” 
The Journal of Neuroscience, 33 (43), 17188–17196. 
“GiveWell: Our Criteria” (2013), http://www.givewell.org/criteria. 
Giving USA: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the year 2014 (2015). Chicago: Giving 
USA Foundation. 
Grant, Adam (2007), “Relational Job Design and The Motivation to Make a Prosocial 
Difference,” Academy of Management Review, 32, 393–417. 
Halberstadt, Jamin, and Gillian Rhodes (2000), “The Attractiveness of Nonface Averages: 
Implications for an Evolutionary Explanation of the Attractiveness of Average Faces,” 
Psychological Science, 11 (4), 285–9. 
Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Jeff E. Biddle (1994), “Beauty and the Labor Market,” American 
Economic Review, American Economic Association, 84 (5), 1174–94. 
Hatfield, Elaine, John T. Cacioppo and Richard L. Rapson (1994), Emotional contagion.  
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
“IUCN Red List 2014” (2014), http://www.iucnredlist.org/. 
Kahneman, Daniel (2011), Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. 
39 
——— and Shane Frederick (2002), “Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in 
Intuitive Judgment,” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, 
Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 49–81. 
Kogut, Tehila, and Ilana Ritov (2005), “The Identified Victim Effect: An Identified Group, or 
Just a Single Individual,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18 (3), 157–67. 
Kubovy, Michael (2000), “Visual Aesthetics,” Encyclopedia of Psychology, 8, 188–93. 
Kurt, Didem, and J. Jeffrey Inman (2013), “Mispredicting Others’ Valuations: Self-Other 
Difference in the Context of Endowment,” Journal of Consumer Research, 40 (1), 78–89. 
Landy, David, and Harold Sigall (1974), “Beauty is Talent: Task Evaluation as a Function of the 
Performer’s Physical Attractiveness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29 
(3), 299–304. 
Landry, Craig, Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, and Nicholas G. Rupp (2005), 
“Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment,” National Bureau of Economic Research, No. w11611. 
Langlois, Judith H., Lisa Kalakanis, Adam J. Rubenstein, Andrea Larson, Monica Hallam, and 
Monica Smoot (2000), “Maxims or Myths of Beauty? A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical 
Review,” Psychological Bulletin, 126 (3), 390–423. 
Leder, Helmut, Benno Belke, Andries Oeberst, and Dorothee Augustin (2004), “A Model of 
Aesthetic Appreciation and Aesthetic Judgments,” British Journal of Psychology, 95 (4), 
489–508. 
Lerner, Jennifer S., and Philip E. Tetlock (1999), “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,” 
Psychological Bulletin, 125 (2), 255–75. 
40 
Loewenstein, George (1996), “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65 (3), 272–92. 
——— and Deborah A. Small (2007), “The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: The Vicissitudes of 
Human Sympathy and Caring,” Review of General Psychology, 11 (2), 112–26. 
MacAskill, William (2015), Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a 
Difference, New York: Gotham. 
Milkman, Katherine L., Dolly Chugh, and Max H. Bazerman (2009), “How can Decision 
Making be Improved?” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4 (4), 379–83. 
———, Todd Rogers, and Max H. Bazerman (2008), “Harnessing our Inner Angels and 
Demons: What we have Learned about Want/Should Conflicts and how that Knowledge 
can Help us Reduce Short-sighted Decision Making,” Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 3 (4), 324–38. 
———, ———, and ——— (2009), “Highbrow Films Gather Dust: Time-inconsistent 
Preferences and Online DVD Rentals,” Management Science, 55 (6), 1047–59. 
Miller, Arthur G. (1970), “Role of Physical Attractiveness in Impression Formation,” 
Psychonomic Science, 19 (4), 241–3. 
Mims, Patricia R., John J. Hartnett, and W. Robert Nay (1975), “Interpersonal Attraction and 
Help Volunteering as a Function of Physical Attractiveness,” Journal of Psychology, 89 
(1), 125–31. 
Mobius, Markus M., and Tanya S. Rosenblat (2006), “Why Beauty Matters,” The American 
Economic Review, 96 (1), 222–35. 
Morewedge, Carey K., and Daniel Kahneman (2010), “Associative Processes in Intuitive 
Judgment,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14 (10), 435–40. 
41 
Mulford, Matthew, John Orbell, Catherine Shatto, and Jean Stockard (1998), “Physical 
Attractiveness, Opportunity, and Success in Everyday Exchange,” American Journal of 
Sociology, 103 (6), 1565–92. 
Newman, George E., and Paul Bloom (2012), “Art and Authenticity: The Importance of 
Originals in Judgments of Value,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141 
(3), 558. 
Norman, Donald A. (2004), Emotional Design: Why we Love (or Hate) Everyday Things, New 
York: Basic Books. 
Oppenheimer, Daniel M., Tom Meyvis, and Nicolas Davidenko (2009), “Instructional 
Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power,” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45 (4), 867–72. 
Owen, David (2013), “Bears Do It,” The New Yorker, September 2, 26–31. 
Polman, Evan (2012), “Self-other Decision Making and Loss Aversion,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 119 (2), 141–50. 
Ratner, Rebecca K., and Barbara E. Kahn (2002), “The Impact of Private versus Public 
Consumption on Variety-Seeking Behavior,” Journal of Consumer Research, 29 (2), 
246–57. 
Ratner, Rebecca K., and Dale T. Miller (2001), “The Norm of Self-interest and Its Effects on 
Social Action,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81 (1), 53–62. 
Reber, Rolf, Norbert Schwarz, and Piotr Winkielman (2004), “Processing Fluency and Aesthetic 
Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver’s Processing Experience?” Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 8 (4), 364–82. 
42 
Reimann, Martin, Judith Zaichkowsky, Carolin Neuhaus, Thomas Bender, and Bernd Weber 
(2010), “Aesthetic Package Design: A Behavioural, Neural, and Psychological 
Investigation,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20 (4), 431–41. 
Rhodes, Gillian (2006), “The Evolutionary Psychology of Facial Beauty,” Annual Review of 
Psychology, 57, 199–226. 
Rottenstreich, Yuval, and Christopher K. Hsee (2001), “Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On 
the Affective Psychology of Risk,” Psychological Science, 12 (3): 185–90. 
Singer, Peter (2009), The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty, New York: 
Random House, Inc. 
——— (2013), ‘The Why and How of Effective Altruism,’ TED2013. 
http://www.ted.com/talks/peter_singer_the_why_and_how_of_effective_altruism. 
Small, Deborah A., and Cynthia Cryder (2016), “Prosocial Consumer Behavior,” Current 
Opinion in Psychology, 10, 107–11. 
———, George Loewenstein, and Paul Slovic (2007), “Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact 
of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102 (2), 143–53. 
———, and Uri Simonsohn (2008), “Friends of Victims: Personal Experience and Prosocial 
Behavior,” Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 532–42. 
———, and Nicole M. Verrochi (2009),”The Face of Need: Facial Emotion Expression on 
Charity Advertisements,” Journal of Marketing Research, 46 (6), 777–87. 
Smith, Robert W., David Faro, and Katherine A. Burson (2013), “More for the Many: The 
Influence of Entitativity on Charitable Giving,” Journal of Consumer Research, 39 
(February), 961–76. 
43 
Stanovich, Keith E., and Richard F. West (2000), “Advancing the Rationality Debate,” 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23 (5), 701–17. 
Stanovich, K. (2009), Distinguishing the Reflective, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Minds: Is It 
Time for a Tri-process Theory. In In Two Minds (Evans, J.S.B.T. and Frankish, K., eds), 
pp. 33–54, Oxford University Press. 
Townsend, Claudia, and Suzanne B. Shu (2010), “When and How Aesthetics Influences 
Financial Decisions,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20 (4), 452–8. 
———, and Sanjay Sood (2012), “Self-Affirmation Through the Choice of Highly Aesthetic 
Products,” Journal of Consumer Research, 39 (2), 415–28. 
UNICEF (2014), http://www.unicef.org. 
West, Stephen G., and T. Jan Brown (1975), “Physical Attractiveness, the Severity of the 
Emergency and Helping: A Field Experiment and Interpersonal Simulation,” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 11 (6), 531–38. 
Wispé, Lauren (1986), “The Distinction between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a 
Concept a Word Is Needed,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50 (2), 314–
21. 
Zaatari, Darine, Brian G. Palestis, and Robert Trivers (2009), “Fluctuating Asymmetry of 
Responders Affects Offers in the Ultimatum Game Oppositely According to 
Attractiveness or Need as Perceived by Proposers,” Ethology, 115 (7), 627–32. 
Zhao, Xinshu, John G. Lynch, and Qimei Chen (2010), “Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths 
and Truths about Mediation Analysis,” Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (2), 197–206.  
44 
Footnotes 
1 Recent conceptualizations of want versus should preferences characterize them as tradeoffs that 
occur over time, with want options being those that are immediately gratifying and should 
options being those that are gratifying over the long term (e.g., Bitterly et al. 2014; Milkman, 
Rogers, and Bazerman 2008). In the current research, we rely on previous broader 
conceptualizations of want versus should tradeoffs in which want preferences are infused with a 
notion of desire even if that desire does not have a clear intertemporal component (e.g., 
Bazerman et al. 1998). 
 
2
All photo stimuli are available via e-mail from the first author. 
 
3
Sample sizes for all experiments were determined ex ante. At the end of all experiments, we 
included an “instructional manipulation check” (IMC; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 
2009) to identify inattentive participants. Participants who failed this attention check were 
removed before any analyses were conducted; thus, all reported results exclude them. Here we 
report the numbers of participants excluded from each experiment based on this criterion: Study 
1B: 117; Study 1C: 70; Study 2: 55; Study 3: 75; Study 4: 112; Study 5: 281; Study 6: 165. 
 
4
We conducted a similar study, reported in Web Appendix B, using a choice set including four 
boys rather than four girls. 
 
5
We report social competence and emotional expression ratings from Study 4 here. Consistent 
with findings from Fisher and Ma (2014) and other research about the beauty premium (Langlois 
et al. 2000), participants in the Deliberative condition rated Angelica, the most attractive 
recipient, as also the most sociable (MAngelica = 4.26, MVera = 3.07, MMaria = 3.75, MSilva = 3.01, ps 
< .0005), most helpful (MAngelica = 4.10, MVera = 3.57, MMaria = 4.01, MSilva = 3.39, ps < .05), most 
intelligent (MAngelica = 3.61, MVera = 3.09, MMaria = 3.15, MSilva = 2.89, ps < .0005), and as having 
the least negative facial expression (MAngelica = 1.33, MVera = 3.11, MMaria = 1.49, MSilva = 3.24, ps 
< .0005). 
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TABLE 1 
Study 1A: Beauty Ratings, Actual Endangerment, and Perceived Endangerment Ratings 
Animals 
Average 
beauty ratings 
(SE) 
Actual 
endangerment status 
(numerical level 
from IUCN 2015) 
Average perceived 
level of 
endangerment (SE) 
Giraffe 5.81 (.15) Least Concern (1) 3.66 (.15) 
Zebra 5.12 (.15) Least Concern (1) 3.49 (.16) 
Flamingo 4.79 (.14) Near Threatened (2) 4.02 (.20) 
Elephant 4.66 (.16) Endangered (4) 4.95 (.16) 
Chimpanzee 4.42 (.15) Endangered (4) 4.47 (.16) 
Lemur 4.24 (.16) Endangered (4) 3.93 (.17) 
Orangutan 4.07 (.16) Endangered (4) 4.77 (.16) 
Penguin 4.06 (.16) Vulnerable (3) 3.87 (.17) 
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FIGURE 1 
STUDY 1A: PERCENTAGE OF SPONSORSHIPS FOR THE MOST AND LEAST 
BEAUTIFUL ANIMALS 
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FIGURE 2 
STUDY 1B: PERCENTAGE OF ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED BY EACH CHILD BASED ON 
CONTROL VERSUS BEAUTY CONDITION 
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FIGURE 3 
STUDY 2: PERCENTAGE OF ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED BY EACH CHILD BASED ON 
INTUITIVE VERSUS DELIBERATIVE CONDITION 
 
**p < .01 
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FIGURE 4 
STUDY 3: PERCENTAGE OF ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED BY EACH CHILD BASED ON 
INTUITIVE VERSUS DELIBERATIVE CONDITION 
 
*p < .05 
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FIGURE 5 
STUDY 4: PERCENTAGE OF ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED BY EACH CHILD BASED ON 
INTUITIVE VERSUS DELIBERATIVE CONDITION 
 
*p < .05 
***p < .001 
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FIGURE 6 
STUDY 6: CHOICES BASED ON WANT VERSUS SHOULD PREFERENCES 
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